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Key recommendations
1. Peace mediators and constitutional advisors must pay attention to the importance of 
sequencing in the political settlement process to ensure successful transitions from 
conflict to stable constitutional order. Where incremental political agreement and 
trust-building are required, a staged constitution-making process is often necessary. 
While peace negotiations and constitutional negotiations may occur in different and 
distinct forums, it is useful to think of the peace- and constitution-building processes 
as being substantively inter-related, with a common goal of bringing about a new 
political settlement (i.e. an agreement on how power is to be held and exercised). 
2. Consideration of the sequencing of a political settlement process must be based on 
an ongoing analysis of the extent to which there is sufficient political agreement 
underlying each stage of the process. Where political agreement is absent or tentative, 
there needs to be a clear plan to assist the brokering of such agreement. Ensuring 
some form of negative peace before starting substantive negotiations is vital, as is 
acknowledging that several phases of agreement and constitution-making may be 
needed to reach the final constitutional stage. 
3. Where a constitution-making process is initiated without sufficient elite buy-in to 
the political settlement process, public participation will not be enough to build 
a political settlement. Those supporting such processes should think of the wider 
political settlement strategies that need to be put in place to support constitutional 
discussions, and the wider pressures that need to be exerted to ensure that the 
process of seeking agreement between political and military power brokers continues 
alongside the constitution-building process.
4. A complex set of trade-offs between the short-term requirements of forging a 
political settlement and the longer-term requirements of sustaining peace through 
constitutional arrangements must be managed. These trade-offs must be well 
understood and well managed, which requires understanding the core dilemmas 
that sequencing must address. 
5. A balance needs to be found between allowing time to build consensus and using 
deadlines to keep the process on track. Sometimes settlement processes must be 
pushed forward within short timeframes in which some political consensus for 
progress is present. However, deadlines—often internationally imposed—that are 
too tight tend to limit the chances for broader consultation and participation and 
can lead local stakeholders to lose confidence in the process and even look for extra-
constitutional ways to assert leverage. A narrow focus on meeting deadlines can leave 
underlying conflict dynamics unaddressed. While deadlines are important and often 
necessary, they should be framed in a manner that leaves some flexibility to rethink 
the constitution-building process where it faces unforeseen fundamental challenges. 
Building fixed deadlines into legal instruments that cannot be adhered to (and will 
likely be disregarded) jeopardizes attempts to foster a commitment to abide by the 
legal rules of the game (IDEA 2016a: 20).
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6. A balance (and the right timing) needs to be found between attaining enough 
political–military elite buy-in for the peace and constitution-building process, 
and securing broader social buy-in (through having political elites elected, and/or 
by directly opening up the process to public participation). Staged constitution-
making processes can enable incremental political agreement at an early stage of the 
process, and broader consultative constitutional processes over time. The issue of 
how to balance elite participation and broader representation in the process is closely 
connected to the question of timing, in particular the timing of elections. Sometimes 
the pressure to hold elections forces an early end to the interim constitutional period, 
and does not allow enough time for the parties to at least arrive at a partial political 
settlement. Alternatives might need to be found to ensure broad representation 
and social inclusion in the process without necessarily or immediately calling for 
elections. 
7. International actors need to make a greater effort to understand the underlying 
political dynamics of both the political settlement process and the constitution-
making process. In particular, where a participative constitution-making process 
takes place with no (or thin) commitment to a political settlement, international 
guarantees are likely to be necessary to support the process. However, international 
actors that mediate and/or guarantee constitutional arrangements in peace talks 
should also be aware that the longer-term success of any constitutional arrangement 
will require a level of public consent. They should also be aware that arrangements 
need to be open enough to change in response to broader demands for inclusion. 
Navigating between the need for sufficient high-level political agreement and 
sufficient public engagement involves exercising good political judgement, which in 
turn requires international organizations to dedicate appropriate resources, and in 
particular specialized staff deployed for long enough to understand the complexities 
of the local context. 
8. Attempts should be made to include spoilers (those who stay outside the process 
and attempt to destabilize it through ongoing violence) in the political settlement 
process, even when the groups and their key demands are considered illegitimate. 
Where processes have been set up to exclude—or have resulted in the exclusion of—
key groups with the capacity to destabilize, spoiler dynamics should be identified 
and strategies put in place to address them. Where the groups cannot be included 
or accommodated, their legitimate demands should be identified and constructively 
engaged by ensuring that the political settlement, including the constitution, 
maintains a broad appeal to their potential constituents. Where spoilers are 
successfully included, strategies should be developed to avoid them ‘spoiling the 
process from the inside’. Approaches such as ‘sufficient consensus’ have been used to 
enable participation while protecting processes from insider spoiler tactics. 
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Executive summary
This Policy Paper focuses on sequencing peace agreements and constitutional 
arrangements within the broader political settlement processes in fragile and conflict-
affected settings. Political settlements comprise the underlying agreed understandings 
about how power is to be held and exercised. It is often assumed that there is a specific 
sequence to reach a political settlement: typically, a ceasefire or peace agreement that 
includes (or is followed by) transitional political arrangements or an interim constitution 
that culminates in some form of long-term constitutional arrangement. According to 
this assumption, the political settlement is understood to develop as part of the peace 
and constitution-building process. In practice, matters are likely to be much more 
complicated. Peace agreements and constitutional arrangements often fail to reflect a 
broadly shared political settlement, and require further negotiations to resolve conflict 
and start building sustainable peace. 
Political settlements can be understood, on the one hand, as distinct from peace 
agreements and constitutional arrangements, but on the other hand as part of the same 
jigsaw puzzle, which may be arranged in different ways that often depart from the linear 
model. For instance, while both peace agreements and constitutional arrangements may 
reflect an underlying political understanding between the parties at the negotiating 
table, the connection between these documents and any shared political settlement can 
vary significantly. 
While peace agreements primarily aim to end a conflict, and are the result of negotiations 
between most (if not all) parties to the conflict, they can take different forms, including 
(a) ceasefires or other pre-negotiation agreements; (b) framework peace agreements 
that also address the core issues of the conflict; and (c) implementation agreements. 
Transitional political arrangements, interim constitutions and final constitutions will 
often be intermingled with ceasefire or peace agreements in complex sequences. 
Whether or not the process starts with a ceasefire/peace agreement, the parties often 
reach some form of transitional political arrangement that sets the stage for how power 
is to be held and exercised for a limited time. Transitional political arrangements 
only provide an attenuated legal framework, either working outside the former 
legal structures or within the arrangements of the pre-existing constitution. Interim 
constitutions can form an additional step towards a final constitution by providing a 
clearer constitutional structure with legal supremacy, sometimes enabling elections, 
and providing a roadmap for negotiating and drafting a final constitution. 
Since 1990, a total of 23 political settlement processes in fragile and conflict-affected 
settings have concluded in a ‘final’ constitution (see Chapter 3). Based on an analysis 
of these processes, this paper identifies four broad sequencing patterns:
10      International IDEA
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1. Partial peace (or ceasefire) agreements (not including 
transitional political arrangements) lead to a final constitution or 
a fundamental review of the old constitution
This sequencing has tended to involve ceasefire agreements focused on demobilizing 
non-state actors and integrating them into the state’s political and legal structures, as 
well as commitments to broader democratization, social inclusion and constitutional 
reform. Direct moves from a ceasefire agreement to a constitution have mostly been 
enabled by a political–military deal to end the conflict before starting constitutional 
negotiations, the pre-existence of a viable institutional framework to govern in the 
interim, and a conflict dynamic in which the state sought accommodation with armed 
opponents as well as broader progressive social movements. The risks of this sequencing 
are that powerful military actors negotiating the political settlement may have undue 
influence over the shape of the future constitution; or conversely, that the political 
settlement may only contain a broad commitment to constitutional reform which may 
or may not be forthcoming. 
2. Transitional political arrangements (either in a peace agreement 
or a stand-alone document) lead to a final constitution
In this sequence, post-conflict political settlement processes perhaps involving a 
ceasefire/peace agreement, either include or lead to some form of ‘transitional political 
arrangement’. Transitional political arrangements outline the next steps of the political 
settlement process, sometimes laying out the process of producing the final constitution; 
they often need the support of the international community as guarantors in absence 
of a strong legal framework. This sequencing pattern has been typically used in cases 
of post-election violence; it has also been used where a power vacuum needs to be 
immediately filled before a constitution-building process can start. The disadvantage 
is that the quick ‘fix’ of the transitional political arrangement has little traditional 
democratic legitimacy, and creates pressure to move quickly to elections rather than 
taking the time for constitutional deliberation and consensus-building.
3. An interim constitution, perhaps preceded by a peace (or 
ceasefire) agreement, fulfils the role of a peace agreement and 
sets the stage for a final constitution
In this model, the interim constitution plays the leading role in the political settlement 
process, until the adoption of a final constitution. Even though peace or ceasefire 
agreements may precede the interim constitution, these do not include transitional 
political arrangements. The advantage of this sequencing is that it facilitates a pact 
between political and military actors regarding the broad parameters of a political 
settlement, enabling some sort of elections prior to the final constitution-building 
process, while also enabling a broader participative process. The disadvantage is that 
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many of the critical elements of the political settlement can be left to the constitution-
building process, which creates difficulties if the participative process is unable to agree 
on difficult issues, or the major political actors are not kept on board. 
4. A combination of (2) and (3), whereby transitional political 
arrangements are followed by an interim constitution, which 
precedes the final constitutional drafting stage
This sequencing pattern involves a peace agreement with transitional political 
arrangements, often preceded by earlier ceasefire/peace agreements, followed by an 
interim constitution and then a final constitution. This pattern usually occurs in 
countries that have experienced prolonged conflict, where the institutional framework 
is weak or non-existent, and where incremental constitutional processes are used to 
reach a joint political and constitutional settlement. The advantages of this sequencing 
are that it enables an immediate form of government and an ongoing incremental 
process that attempts to produce a constitutional text reflecting a political settlement. 
However, this model generally reflects the difficulty of forging a constitutional 
settlement in these settings, which are characterized by large-scale conflict and state 
failure. Constitutional texts produced in this pattern often do not reflect broad-based 
agreement and struggle to be effective. 
These four models include transitions from conflict to peace that, while broadly grouped 
into generic sequencing patterns, also vary according to the length of the process, the 
number of agreements attempted or needed, the specific content of the agreements 
and, perhaps most critically, the relationship between the constitution-making process 
and the political settlement process.
The very complex and unfinished political settlement processes in Libya, Somalia and 
Yemen (described in detail in Chapter 4) demonstrate the fact that the sequence of 
events is often not chosen but emerges in response to other imperatives. Furthermore, 
experience in each of these countries shows the critical importance of the relationship 
between peace- and constitution-building processes and the underlying political 
settlement process. These cases illustrate (a) the complexity of building a political 
settlement, (b) the fact that a linear model is the exception rather than the rule, and (c) 
the need to take into account contextual issues in deciding which sequencing pattern 
is most appropriate in a specific setting. These contextual issues include the nature 
and scale of the conflict, which actors are involved or excluded, the relative weakness 
of the institutional framework, the intensity of international interventions, as well as 
the emergence of critical junctures that either support or threaten to derail the process. 
The paper furthermore identifies six process-specific factors that correspond to six 
short- and long-term requirements that might help in selecting the most appropriate 
sequencing pattern. These requirements can also be understood as trade-offs that 
stakeholders need to bear in mind when attempting to reach a political settlement 
(and a constitutional order capable of sustaining and developing such a settlement). 
These trade-offs arise because while agreement between warring parties is necessary in 
order to reach a political settlement, a broader set of more principled commitments is 
required for constitutional effectiveness and the rule of law, and these two elements are 
sometimes in conflict. The trade-offs include:
1. Creating necessary peace versus building sustainable peace. While the absence of 
violence is necessary to start constitutional negotiations, some stakeholders 
require constitutional assurances before laying down their weapons. Staging 
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constitution-making through interim arrangements and/or interim constitutions 
can enable a balance between sufficient guarantees to armed actors and sufficient 
future capacity for the political settlement to be broadened and deepened. 
2. Temporary agreement versus permanent (constitutional) text. Assuring political/
military actors of the permanency of agreements needs to be balanced with the 
requirement to maintain enough flexibility in the process to allow for future 
constitutional development. 
3. Requiring speed versus taking time. Where the parties to the conflict cannot easily 
agree to the terms of a new political settlement, again a multi-stage approach 
might be warranted. This approach also needs to balance the short window of 
opportunity for change, and the related requirement for a quick process—from 
transitional government structures to final constitution—versus the need to take 
time to negotiate and build consensus. 
4. Participation versus elite pact. Political–military buy-in and broad participation are 
both important for the future implementation of a constitutional framework, and 
must be secured in different ways at different stages of the process. Depending 
on the context, elite inclusion may need to be prioritized over broad societal 
involvement.
5. Including versus excluding spoilers. Depending on the nature and virulence of 
(potential) spoilers, it may be necessary to assess the consequences of including or 
excluding specific groups in order to avoid a derailment of the process. 
6. International guarantees versus locally owned process. Depending on the status of 
the institutional framework, international support for the political settlement 
process might be needed to reassure local actors. Yet international actors must also 
pay attention to building and maintaining their own legitimacy while ensuring 
‘locally-owned’ processes.
While the design of a process may emerge organically rather than through the conscious 
choice of the actors involved, it is important to recognize that all process choices come 
with risks and disadvantages—and to acknowledge, understand and mitigate those 
risks.
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1. Introduction
This Policy Paper focuses on issues of sequencing in political settlement processes 
where there is violent conflict. Negotiated transitions from conflict typically involve a 
formal peace deal and a new or significantly revised constitutional arrangement. These 
arrangements attempt to establish an agreed power map between elites that (a) details 
how the political and legal institutions will hold and exercise power and (b) serves as a 
new social contract to underpin the state. The aim of this power map is to enable the 
parties to the conflict to move away from violent conflict by reaching a new political 
settlement. 
It is often assumed that there is a specific sequence involved in reaching a political 
settlement and constitutionalizing new arrangements. An ideal sequence would involve 
antagonistic elites coming together to negotiate a basic framework of cooperation that 
might lead to a ceasefire or peace agreement, including perhaps an interim governing 
arrangement, and eventually some form of longer-term constitutional arrangement, 
reflecting a certain level of popular consultation or a less ‘elite-driven’ set of arrangements 
(Darby and MacGinty 2000). 
For example, the Geneva process for Syria initiated in 2012 set out the following 
proposed sequence: 
1. a ceasefire (to allow for humanitarian intervention), followed by a transitional 
governing body with full executive powers, formed on the basis of mutual consent, 
which would establish a neutral environment; 
2. a National Dialogue process and constitutional and legislative review subject to 
popular approval; and 
3. free and fair multiparty elections for the new institutions and offices, once the 
new constitutional order had been established (Geneva Communiqué 2012; 
Carter Center 2015). 
The process set out by the Gulf Cooperation Council for Yemen in 2011 was to follow 
a similar trajectory, with an agreed transitional governing body, a national dialogue 
process and a new constitutional order (see Chapter 4).
This ideal-type sequence is logical, and seems to stage the process in ways that are 
appropriate to the nature and type of agreement being sought: a peace agreement to 
end the conflict, with a subsequent broader, more participatory, constitution-making 
process that would widen the elite pact into a fully-fledged social contract.
In practice, however, the sequencing of processes often becomes more complicated. Even 
if the ideal-type sequence formally holds, the degree to which the peace agreement or the 
new constitutional framework reflects a new political settlement between warring elites 
can vary significantly. In some processes the peace agreement is simply a tentative and 
partial move towards a political settlement; the burden of creating and institutionalizing 
the new political settlement is left to the constitution-building process. Yet peace 
agreements can limit the options for a broader participative constitutional process, 
because they may set the parameters within which specific issues are to be negotiated 
and drafted, or constrain the way in which the public will be involved in the process. 
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Moreover, even when a process produces an ultimate constitution, whether it reflects 
a political settlement may remain contested and require both further negotiations 
and further constitutional iterations brokered through more peace agreements or 
constitutional revisions if the constitution is to help resolve the conflict (see the Nepal 
example in Chapter 3). 
To add to these complications, peace agreements and constitutional arrangements 
can overlap in different ways. An interim or final constitution may itself represent a 
form of negotiated peace agreement, shaped by negotiations between former foes as 
much as (or more than) public participation—such as South Africa’s interim ‘peace 
agreement constitution’ (Easterday 2014). Alternatively, a peace agreement may include 
interim government arrangements (e.g. the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the 
Conflict in South Sudan) or even an interim or final constitution—such as Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’s ‘constitutional peace agreement’, which included the Constitution 
as an annex to the Dayton Peace Agreement (Bell 2008). These difficulties mean that 
sequencing often deviates from the linear prototype, and, as the case studies suggest, 
often involves multiple peace agreements and constitutional iterations as part of a 
complicated attempt to reach a political settlement. 
This paper aims to address the gap in the constitution-making and peacebuilding 
literatures regarding descriptive and normative accounts of the relationship between 
peace agreements and constitutional arrangements in political settlement processes. 
It explores the sequencing of peace deals and constitutional arrangements in order to 
better understand when (and why) sequencing does not follow the logical model, and 
the implications for any coherent and workable constitutional framework. This report 
is an initial exploration of these issues, intended to provide initial recommendations 
and trigger further deliberation. In doing so, it draws on deliberations at a December 
2015 workshop entitled ‘Constitution Building in Political Settlement Processes: The 
Quest for Inclusion’ (International IDEA 2016). 
The paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 describes the existing literature on 
sequencing to frame the key research questions, and presents working definitions 
for peace agreements and different constitutional arrangements. In Chapter 3, these 
definitions are used to explore varieties of sequencing patterns, using empirical data 
drawn from a review of peace agreements and constitution-making processes globally. 
This work draws on a number of existing and new data sources, such as the Constitute 
database developed by the Comparative Constitutions Project at the University of Texas 
at Austin; data on interim constitutions collected by International IDEA (Zulueta-
Fülscher 2015); and the University of Edinburgh’s peace agreements database, PA-X.1 
Chapter 4 examines three complex case studies in more detail: Libya, Somalia and 
Yemen. These countries initially pursued the ideal-type sequence, which either broke 
down or did not come to fruition; the peace and constitution-making processes then 
came apart in different ways. These case studies call into question whether (and how) 
1 Access the Constitute database at <http://www.constituteproject.org>. Access the current iteration of the PA-X 
database at <http://www.peaceagreements.org>. The final iteration is due online in 2017.
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constitution-building processes can be successful where there is no underlying political 
settlement. Chapter 5 concludes by distilling initial lessons for future policymakers in 
conflict-affected states. 
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2. Sequencing peace agreements 
and constitutions in political 
settlement processes: a conceptual 
framework
In situations of violent conflict, negotiated agreements—including ceasefire or peace 
agreements and documents detailing constitutional arrangements—attempt to reach a 
new political settlement between the warring protagonists, which is ideally supported 
by the broader society. Such political settlements aim to move the country or region 
from conflict to a situation characterized by constitutional commitments to good 
governance and the rule of law. 
The sequencing—and the success or failure—of these negotiated agreements depends 
on a number of factors, including the diverse processes through which a political 
settlement is reached; when (and how) peace agreements and constitutions reach a 
political settlement; when (and why) constitution-making separates from the political 
settlement process; and the consequences of such a separation.
The first contribution of this paper is to suggest that the underlying political 
settlement—an agreed understanding of how power is to be held and exercised—
should be understood as distinct from the peace agreement and constitution. These 
three elements represent closely related pieces of the same puzzle, which may be 
arranged in different ways depending on the process and context (see Figure 2.1). From 
this perspective, the process is unlikely to be linear. 
The second contribution of the paper is its attempt to further examine how these 
different pieces of the jigsaw fit together; it describes several sequencing patterns and 
considers the ways in which these patterns are affected by stakeholders’ underlying 
agreements or disagreements about the political settlement. 
Figure 2.1. Interactions between political settlements, peace negotiations and 
constitutional settlements
Peace Negotiations Constitutional Settlement
Political Settlement
The political settlement literature says little about sequencing within political settlement 
processes, from peace negotiations to the constitutional settlement. Until recently, the 
literatures on political settlements and governance viewed the constitution as a singular 
‘event’, ‘document’ or even ‘institution’ within a broader set of legal, political and social 
arrangements (Laws 2012). Similarly, the literature on peacebuilding has often viewed 
peace agreements and constitutions as separate endeavours within a peace process 
(Samuels 2009; Paris and Sisk 2009). 
Increasingly, however, practitioners and academics understand both peace agreements 
and constitutional arrangements to be part of a more complex process of achieving a 
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political settlement (see Hart 2001; also Darby and MacGinty 2000: 8; Bell 2008: 63; 
Choudry 2010). In one of the earliest contributions, Hart usefully pointed out that 
a post-conflict constitution should be understood more as ‘a process, a continuing 
conversation, or a forum for negotiation amid conflict and division’ rather than as a 
document which codifies the resolution of the conflict (2001: 154). Others suggest that 
peace agreements and constitutions are not clearly distinguishable, as they may merge 
in the form of ‘constitutional peace agreements’ or ‘peace agreement constitutions’ (Bell 
2008; Easterday 2014). For example, an interim constitution can also be a form of 
negotiated peace agreement (as in South Africa) or a peace agreement constitution; a 
peace agreement may also contain a constitution (as in Bosnia and Herzegovina) or 
set out a constitutional blueprint (as in Northern Ireland). A consensus is therefore 
emerging on the close relationship between peace and constitution-making processes 
(Widner 2005; Bell 2000, 2008; Samuels 2005; Brandt et al. 2011; Easterday 2014). 
Still, the way in which sequencing patterns affect constitution-building has not been 
thoroughly addressed. This paper explores sequencing issues, crucially focusing on the 
following questions: to what extent should a new constitutional framework be based on 
some prior agreement on the nature of the state, and to what extent can the constitution 
be a vehicle for reaching such an agreement? Can constitution-making be successful 
in contexts where there is no prior agreement, especially when conflict is ongoing? 
What is to be done where the circumstances for both peace and constitutionalism 
are unfavourable, and would more attention to sequencing help? Where the peace 
agreement and an interim constitutional framework contain a rudimentary agreement 
between political/military actors on ending the conflict, under what circumstances 
do broader social processes of constitutional development undermine or support that 
agreement? What is the best way to keep the process of elite agreement and broader 
constitutional development on track? 
Understanding the key components of sequencing
To understand sequencing it is useful to define the types of events that occur during 
political settlement processes—and in the production of ceasefire or peace agreements, 
and interim or final constitutional arrangements—and how they attempt to contribute 
to a new political settlement. 
What is a ‘political settlement’? 
Development actors have increasingly used the term ‘political settlement’ to refer to 
the formal and informal political agreements that indicate how power is exercised 
within the state. The term can be defined in a number of ways, but a useful working 
definition is: ‘the forging of a common understanding usually between political elites 
that their best interests or beliefs are served through acquiescence to a framework for 
administering political power’ (di John and Putzel 2009: 4; see also Whaites 2008: 4; 
OECD 2011: 31; Fritz and Menocal 2007: 27; DFID 2010: 22; Kahn 2005, 2010; 
Parks and Cole 2010: 6; Barnes 2009: 9). 
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While most definitions of political settlements emphasize the central role of political 
elites, the literature has also recognized that sustainable settlements and good 
development outcomes depend on broader social contracts that are inclusive of all 
(or most) major social groups (Barnes 2009: 18). Recent contributions suggest that 
broader societal forces can sometimes influence elites, and that broad forms of social 
inclusion can therefore assist in developing and sustaining the settlement (Castillejo 
2014; Laws 2012; Menocal 2015). 
The concept of political settlements has several different roots and meanings—and is 
indeed criticized for its lack of clarity as a result. In particular, it has been noted that the 
term is often used interchangeably with ‘peace settlement’ (Bell 2015; Ingram 2014). 
This paper suggests that the term political settlement usefully highlights the somewhat 
invisible agreement between elites, and often between elites and society more broadly, 
on how power should be constrained and exercised. The more political economy-
driven definitions suggest that political settlements are distinct from, although related 
to, peace settlements or constitutional settlements. While a political settlement may 
be closely aligned with a country’s peace settlement terms or constitution, it comprises 
the underlying political understandings on which those documents are based. A central 
focus of this paper is situations in which peace agreements and new constitutions are 
produced without a clear commitment to a new political settlement. 
What are peace processes and agreements? 
A peace process (or peace negotiations) can be defined as an attempt to bring political 
and/or military elites involved in a conflict to some sort of mutual agreement on ending 
the conflict.2 Peace agreements can be defined as formal documents that are publicly 
produced after discussion with all (or some of ) the conflict’s protagonists. They reflect 
a degree of agreement between those actors, primarily regarding the need to address 
and end physical violence.
Peace processes increasingly produce complex peace agreement pathways, from (a) 
ceasefire or other pre-negotiation agreements, in which warring parties attempt to agree 
to enter formal negotiations, to (b) framework peace agreements that address the core 
issues in the conflict, in a series of agreements or a comprehensive agreement, to (c) 
implementation agreements that aim to ensure that past agreements are implemented, 
or that extend the agreement to new issues or parties (Bell 2006, 2008). Transitional 
political arrangements, interim constitutions and final constitutions will often be 
intermingled in complex sequences that are rarely linear, but often involve moves away 
from, and towards, conflict. 
2 A ‘conflict’ is defined as having caused more than 25 conflict-related deaths in one calendar year (Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program n. d.). A similar definition of peace process and negotiations is as follows: ‘by 
negotiation we mean the process through which two or more clashing parties (either countries or internal 
actors within the same country) agree to discuss their differences in an agreed-upon setting to find a solution 
that will meet their demands. . . . By peace process we mean the consolidation of a negotiation scheme 
once the thematic agenda and the procedures to follow have been defined, along with the calendar and the 
facilitators. Therefore, negotiation is just one stage in a peace process’ (Fisas 2015: 5–6).
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What are transitional political arrangements, interim constitutions 
and final constitutions? 
As set out in the data in Chapter 3, constitution-making in conflict-affected settings is 
often incremental. Different forms of interim constitutional arrangements may attempt 
to pave the way towards a final constitution and/or elections.3 The trajectory towards 
a ‘final’ constitution can evolve, for example, from a fairly basic transitional political 
arrangement in a peace agreement (or a separate transitional political charter) to an 
interim constitution that operates during the transition period, which sketches out the 
process of drafting and adopting a final constitution. 
Transitional political arrangements, interim constitutions and ‘final’ constitutions all 
represent a ‘power map’ for the country and provide a legal basis for government. 
However, they do so for different lengths of time, in different degrees of detail and/or 
for different purposes. Before examining the 23 cases in the next chapter, it is useful to 
explain the distinctions between these arrangements. 
A transitional (or interim) political arrangement is a mini power map that defines 
how power will be held and exercised during a transitional period; this arrangement 
involves replacing at least some of the institutions upheld by the country’s prior 
constitution. Transitional political arrangements can—but do not need to—be part of 
peace agreements, as they set out new governance structures for the transition. Interim 
arrangements differ slightly from interim constitutions, as they are not designed to 
form a full constitutional arrangement, but to provide an attenuated legal framework 
to serve as a basis for government during a short transition period. Unlike interim 
constitutions, they do not provide a new form of legal supremacy for the arrangements as 
a whole, and either work outside the former legal structures or within the arrangements 
of the existing formal constitution.
An interim constitution can be defined as ‘a constituent instrument that asserts its legal 
supremacy for a limited period of time pending the enactment of a contemplated 
final constitution. An interim constitution therefore, (a) constitutes (transitional) 
government structures; (b) asserts legal supremacy, formally established in the 
document; (c) is limited temporally; and (d) provides for a future constitutional process’ 
(Zulueta-Fülscher 2015: 9). The origin and role of interim constitutions can vary 
greatly. Sometimes they may in effect be the peace agreement: they may be the result 
of a negotiated agreement between the main protagonists to the conflict, and reflect 
political/military negotiated compromises about the future nature of the state (e.g. the 
South African 1994 Interim Constitution). Alternatively, interim constitutions may 
be the outcome of a peace agreement compromise (such as the Sudanese 2005 Interim 
Constitution). Indeed, it may be unclear whether an interim constitution is a peace 
agreement or a distinctive constitutional product of a peace process. 
3 This paper focuses on political settlement processes that conclude with a new constitutional arrangement rather 
than on those which end with the holding of elections. 
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Final constitutions do not last forever, since they are subject to amendment and revision, 
but their duration is intended to be indefinite.4 Thus, the term ‘final’ is used here 
to distinguish them from interim constitutions that are explicitly transitional and 
temporary. Final constitutions normally contain provisions for their own amendment 
and even replacement. 
The next chapter examines the ways in which peace processes can be sequenced 
regarding timing, but more importantly in terms of the degree to which stakeholders 
reach a political settlement during the negotiation process, and the consequences of 
this settlement for sustaining peace.
 
4 According to Ginsburg, Elkins and Blount (2009), the average duration of a constitution is 19 years.
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3. Sequencing of peace agreements 
and constitutions in the political 
settlement process: patterns and 
issues 
An empirical review of political settlement processes enables a more systematic analysis 
of the variety of ways to sequence the path between peace processes and constitution-
making processes. Since 1990, there have been 23 political settlement processes 
in fragile and conflict-affected settings that have culminated in a new or revised 
constitutional framework (although some remain under pressure to further revise).5 
Analysing these cases reveals that political settlement processes can start with a peace 
agreement, transitional political arrangement or interim constitution, and potentially 
include a number of other stages before reaching a final (or fundamentally amended) 
constitution. The 23 processes are more or less evenly distributed among four possible 
sequencing patterns:
1. Partial peace (or ceasefire) agreements (not including transitional political 
arrangements) lead to a final constitution or a fundamental review of the old 
constitution;
2. Transitional political arrangements (either in a peace agreement or a stand-alone 
document) lead to a final constitution;
3. An interim constitution, sometimes preceded by a peace (or ceasefire) agreement, 
fulfils the role of a peace agreement and sets the stage for a final constitution.
4. A combination of (2) and (3), whereby transitional political arrangements are 
followed by an interim constitution, which moves to a final constitutional 
drafting stage.
The models Explained
1. Partial peace (or ceasefire) agreements lead to a final constitution 
or a fundamental review of the old constitution
 
Ceasefire / peace agreement 
(without transitional political 
arrangements)
Final constitution or (major) 
constitutional amendment
Sometimes peace agreements pave the way for a final constitution without other interim 
constitutional stages. Four political settlement processes in the sample analysed— 
5 The 23 cases are: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Colombia, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, El Salvador, East Timor, Egypt, Guinea, Iraq, Kenya, 
Kosovo, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nepal, Bougainville (Papua New Guinea), Rwanda, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. This sample excludes countries that at the time of writing have not yet completed the political 
settlement process by adopting a final constitution: Eritrea (which is still implementing its 1992 interim 
constitution), Libya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Yemen. Three of these unfinished political settlement 
processes—Libya, Somalia and Yemen—are analysed in Chapter 4.
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Colombia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Bosnia and Herzegovina—broadly followed 
this pattern. This sequencing has tended to involve (a) peace agreements focused on 
reaching a ceasefire; (b) demobilizing non-state actors, and integrating them into the 
state’s political and legal structures; and (c) commitments to broader democratization, 
social inclusion and constitutional reform. 
With the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the countries that followed this model 
signed peace agreements in the 1990s between the government and armed opposition 
groups, which became linked to constitutional reform and development processes. 
The processes tended to involve multiple (often single-issue) peace agreements that 
culminated in a comprehensive peace agreement (or, in the case of Colombia, a new 
‘peace agreement constitution’ in 1991). This direct move from peace agreement to 
constitution was enabled by the detail of the peace agreement provisions, the existence 
of an institutional infrastructure to govern in the interim, and the dynamic of the 
conflicts in which the state sought accommodation with armed opponents (and often 
broader progressive social movements as well). Constitutional revisions then attempted 
to develop and institutionalize the arrangements, either soon after the agreement or, in 
some cases, many years later. 
The advantage of the ‘peace agreement to final constitution’ trajectory is that state and 
non-state armed actors agree on how to end the conflict prior to the constitution-
making process, which means that the constitutional reform process is underpinned 
by some sort of political/military deal. The disadvantages entail two opposite risks. 
The first is the risk that powerful military actors negotiating the political settlement 
will in essence pre-determine the shape of the constitution, denying any broader social 
process a chance to deepen or develop the constitutional commitments. For example, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s one-stage ‘peace agreement to constitution’ process involved 
only the key politico-military actors. While the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement and 
the 1995 Constitution (which was an annex to the agreement) successfully ended the 
conflict, the country has found it impossible to move beyond this initial elite pact into 
broader constitutionalism. Indeed, the peace agreement institutionalized the divisions 
at the heart of the conflict because the elite ‘power-sharing’ pact was fashioned as a 
permanent constitutional settlement (ICG 2014b).
The second risk of the ‘peace agreement to final constitution’ trajectory relates to the 
opposite situation: where the political settlement only contains a broad commitment 
to constitutional reform, and leaves this issue to be worked out as part of a complex 
‘implementation’ phase of the peace process. In contexts that primarily involve the 
demobilization and integration of armed groups, an existing government may benefit 
from the peace negotiations (e.g. demobilizing threats to its power) without delivering 
a transformed, more inclusive constitution, as happened in Guatemala (Brett and 
Delgado 2005). 
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2. Transitional political arrangements lead to a final constitution
Transitional political 
arrangement Final constitution
Peace processes often include either a peace agreement with some form of transitional 
political arrangement to govern during a transitional period, or transitional arrangements 
agreed separately, usually following ceasefire agreements. Transitional political 
arrangements—whether separate or part of a peace agreement—provide a temporary, 
very limited, set of transitional institutions to govern during a certain period of time, 
with the purpose of establishing a new constitution (and/or electoral system).6 Such 
arrangements outline the next steps for the political settlement process, and sometimes 
define the process for producing the final constitution. Seven political settlement 
processes in the sample— Bougainville, Cambodia, Comoros, Guinea, Kenya, Timor 
Leste and Zimbabwe—broadly followed this pattern. This sequencing involves (a) 
decisions by parties—sometimes after numerous attempts to agree ceasefires—to 
negotiate a new political settlement, using the international community as a mediator 
and guarantor of the final agreement; (b) a comprehensive peace agreement that 
includes provisions for transitional political arrangements focused on power sharing; 
and (c) a final constitution.
Kenya and Zimbabwe used this sequence to deal with post-election violence. In Kenya, 
a failed constitution-making process involving broad participation resulted in the 
government proposing its own draft constitution that failed in a 2005 referendum. 
Disputed election results in December 2007 provoked widespread violence across the 
country, and international mediation led to the signing of the 2008 power-sharing 
arrangement, as well as the National Accord and Reconciliation Act—a transitional 
political agreement that created a Government of National Unity between the two 
contending parties—and a series of additional agreements that addressed long-
term issues that had contributed to the violence.7 These agreements also detailed a 
constitutional review process that commenced in February 2009. A Committee of 
Experts (CoE) prepared a draft constitution and reviewed it several times after receiving 
comments from the public and a 27-member Parliamentary Select Committee, which 
was crucial in deciding on key contentious issues and ensured that the constitution 
was connected to the ongoing political settlement. It took the CoE the stipulated 12 
months to finalize the draft constitution and submit it to the National Assembly, which 
unanimously approved the constitution on 2 April 2010. The proposed constitution 
was accepted in a national referendum, and was promulgated on 27 August 2010. 
6 Political settlement processes that achieved elections, rather than a new constitutional settlement (although 
often with ongoing attempts at major constitutional revision), occurred in Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Lebanon, 
Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone but are excluded from this analysis.
7 For further information on, and full texts of, peace agreements see the United Nations’ Peacemaker database, 
<http://peacemaker.un.org>. A full list of agreements referred to in this Policy Paper can be found in Annex A. 
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Zimbabwe followed a similar process. Post-electoral violence in the 2008 presidential 
elections resulted in a transitional political arrangement that mandated the formation 
of a power-sharing government between the Zimbabwe African National Union-
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)—the political party of long-time President Robert 
Mugabe—and the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Formations, which 
represented the opposition to Mugabe. The arrangement managed to stop the violence, 
and established a process for constitutional change that started in April 2008 and 
culminated with the promulgation of the new Constitution in May 2013 after it was 
accepted in a referendum. In this case, however, the dominance of President Mugabe 
and his governing party resulted in the partial disregard of the highly participatory 
constitutional process, with some of the Constitution’s clauses designed not to come 
into effect for 10 years (Allison 2013). 
Cambodia in 1991 (Marks 2010: 210), Comoros in 2001 (although this case has 
been less researched) and Guinea in 2010 also followed this trajectory from agreed 
transitional arrangements to a final constitution. Furthermore, the sequencing has 
been used in cases where a new sub-state territory has achieved independence, in 
the form of new state or an autonomous sub-state region (often based on a peace 
process). The establishment of a new state or autonomous region gives rise to the need 
to broker agreements within the emerging state or state-like territory, in particular 
where disagreements exist between local stakeholders, or where divisions emerge or 
become more acute after break-away from the main state. In post-independence Timor 
Leste, for example, the transitional arrangements established by the United Nations 
created space for a constitution-building process and a new constitution (Regulation 
no. 2001/2). The rushed process, however, did not allow stakeholders to build an 
underlying political settlement; hence, the 2002 Constitution was not able to prevent 
or resolve future violence (Aucoin and Brandt 2010: 271). 
In Bougainville (an autonomous province of Papua New Guinea) the 1994 Charter 
of Mirigini for a New Bougainville addressed the relationship between the island of 
Bougainville and the state of Papua New Guinea, paving the way towards autonomy 
arrangements that were akin to statehood. However, the charter also included elements 
of internal brokerage between parties and groups within Bougainville, establishing 
a transitional governing body to act as a Constituent Assembly. The ultimate 2001 
Bougainville Peace Agreement with Papua New Guinea settled the conflict, and 
stipulated that a referendum on secession should be held not before 10 years from 
the agreement or after a maximum of 15 years from the election of the autonomous 
Bougainville Government; the referendum is scheduled for 15 June 2019. In the 
intervening period, a constitution for Bougainville was developed and promulgated in 
2004, which reflected an attempt to reach a broad-based internal political settlement 
(amendments to the Papua New Guinea Constitution also took place as a result of the 
peace agreement). 
The advantage of this sequencing is that it enables an immediate temporary 
government, where one does not exist or where an election outcome is disputed, until 
the constitution can be changed. For that reason, this approach is often used in cases 
of post-election conflict to attempt to transition from ‘democratic deadlock’ following 
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disputed elections by establishing a form of temporary power sharing, new elections 
and constitutional reform. It has also been used where former parts of the state have 
achieved significant autonomy or self-government, or even independence, to fill an 
immediate power vacuum during the constitution-building process. The disadvantage 
in both settings is that the quick ‘fix’ of the transitional political arrangement has little 
traditional democratic legitimacy, and creates pressure to hold elections quickly, despite 
the need for constitutional deliberation and consensus-building, as was arguably the 
case in Cambodia, Comoros and Timor Leste.
3. An interim constitution serves as a peace agreement and sets the 
stage for a final constitution
(Ceasefire/partial 
peace agreement) Final constitution
Interim 
constitution
In this model, in the absence of a legitimate constitutional framework, an interim 
constitution plays the central role in the political settlement process, leading to the 
adoption of a final constitution. This means that even though there might be peace 
or ceasefire agreements preceding the interim constitution, these do not include 
transitional political arrangements, although they may well agree principles, as well as 
define and shape the transitional process. Six political settlement processes—in Chad, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Madagascar, Nepal and South Africa—broadly 
followed this pattern. 
South Africa is perhaps the best-known example of this sequence. Often hailed as 
a model constitution-building process, when examined in more depth the process 
appears more complex than is usually assumed. A peace process between the African 
National Congress (ANC) and the South African Government resulted in several initial 
agreements, most notably the National Peace Accord—signed on 14 September 1991 
by, among others, over 40 civil society and political groups—which aimed to prevent 
violence rather than change the government structures (Spies 2002). The constitution-
building process remained contentious, and several attempts at multiparty transition 
negotiations failed until April 1993, when the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP) 
started (Barnes and De Klerk 2003). The assassination of Chris Hani—leader of the 
South African Communist Party and key figure in the armed wing of the ANC—the 
same month was the crucial turning point, as it underlined the fragility of the peace 
process and forced the parties to produce results under threat of a return to armed 
conflict. 
The MPNP—in essence a process focused on reaching an ANC–South African 
Government pact—negotiated and agreed to an interim constitution that included 
34 key principles including a governmental framework based on a power-sharing 
arrangement, a new Constitutional Court, and procedures for writing and adopting a 
new constitution. These 34 principles enabled a political settlement between the ANC 
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and the governing National Party of South Africa, because they provided guarantees 
to the outgoing government that its core interests would be protected in the new 
constitution, even once power was handed over to a post-election broad consultative 
process in which it would have little influence. Hence both the interim constitution 
and the elections permitted the emergence of a political settlement between key elites, 
but did not prevent a future participative constitution-building process (Spies 2002). 
The interim constitution was adopted in January 1994, and elections were held in April 
1994. Political parties that had previously been spoilers to the process—the Inkatha 
Freedom Party and several right-wing Afrikaaner groups—threatened to withdraw from 
the process, but after some last-minute constitutional amendments addressing their 
core concerns, they participated in the elections and in part of the constitution-building 
process (Ebrahim and Miller 2010, 141–42). After the election, a Constitutional 
Assembly (CA) delivered a final constitution after a broad participative process. The 
interim constitution had specified that compliance of the Final Constitution with the 
Constitutional Principles had to be approved by the newly established Constitutional 
Court, in a form of guarantee. The court initially struck down the draft constitution, 
but certified it after it was amended and adopted by the CA on 11 October 1996; the 
final version was adopted on 4 February 1997.
While other processes have used a similar sequence, they have often done so without the 
type of underlying political agreement at the interim constitution stage that ultimately 
made the constitution-building process in South Africa relatively successful (Bilchitz et 
al. 2016), as our next examples illustrate. 
In Nepal, a decade-long civil conflict was partly directed against the 1990 constitution 
for its political and legal exclusion of the multi-ethnic, multilingual and religiously 
diverse Nepali society. A ceasefire agreement and a Comprehensive Peace Accord 
committing to a political settlement based on inclusion were agreed in 2006, followed by 
an interim constitution in 2007. The interim constitution was drafted by a 15-member 
commission with limited representation of women and minorities, and with no public 
consultation. It took forward the principles agreed in talks, developing them into a 
constitutional text, but did not resolve critical issues about the shape of the political 
settlement, such as the federal nature of the state, which was left to the constituent 
process. The interim constitution called for a 601-member CA to be elected using a 
highly inclusive electoral system, and set a two-year deadline for the CA to draft a final 
constitution. Despite extending the deadline four times, the CA failed to produce a 
final constitution, and was finally dissolved in July 2012. The country then elected a 
second CA in November 2013. 
Only after the April 2015 earthquake, in June 2015, did the leaders of the four largest 
political parties represented in the CA sign a 16-point agreement that first provided 
for a federation of eight provinces—an issue of great controversy throughout the 
constitutional process. The CA endorsed the draft constitution in July 2015, thereby 
shortening the participatory process, and the final constitution was promulgated on 
20 September 2015, with no referendum. The adoption of the new Constitution was 
marked with violence and widespread protests from minority groups, on the basis that 
it inadequately reflected the inclusive governance structure outlined in the interim 
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constitution (article 138). By January 2016 two amendments to the constitution had 
been adopted dealing with these issues, with more amendments likely. 
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the first transitional period lasted from 
1994 until 1997, when General Joseph Kabila seized power in a coup and decree law 
superseded the 1994 interim constitution. A number of ceasefire/peace agreements 
followed, with a new Transition Constitution (another interim constitution) adopted 
in 2003, setting the stage for a final constitution, which was adopted in 2006. Violence 
again spiked in 2013. 
Other countries have tried to use the ‘concession’ of constitutional change to stave 
off conflict, only to have to enter negotiations over new interim constitutions. For 
example, after unconstitutional (violent) overthrows of their respective governments, 
Chad (1990) and Madagascar (2009) both produced interim constitutions followed 
by the adoption of a final constitution. In Chad, the interim constitution—the 
Transitional National Charter—was to be replaced by a new constitution within 30 
months. In Madagascar, a Charte de la Transition acted as an interim constitution to 
pave the way towards a new constitution. Serious deficiencies in Chad—including a 
lack of horizontal and vertical inclusion and insufficient capacity of the committee 
members in charge of drafting—undermined the legitimacy of the constitution, and 
arguably contributed to the 2005 civil war (Widner n.d.; Zulueta-Fülscher 2015: 
22). In Madagascar, the power-sharing elements of the interim constitution were not 
implemented, and while a new constitution was promulgated in 2010, it continued 
the pattern of insufficient inclusiveness, and the constitutional referendum was widely 
criticized for irregularities. The constitution was followed by a Roadmap for Ending the 
Crisis in Madagascar in 2011, which provided for further transitional arrangements. 
Progress has remained difficult since (Connolly 2013). 
The advantage of this sequencing is that the interim constitution serves as a bridge 
between two different constitutional frameworks. The sequencing enables a pact 
between political/military actors on the broad parameters of a political settlement (and 
often elections) to be reached prior to the constitution-making process, while allowing 
the final constitutional settlement to be based on a broader participative process. The 
disadvantage is that many of the critical elements of the political settlement can be 
left to the constitution-making process, which creates difficulties if the participative 
process is unable to agree on difficult issues. The move directly from a peace agreement 
to an interim constitution often enables some form of elections after the adoption 
of an interim constitution, which eases some of the time pressures during the final 
sequencing stage.
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4. A peace agreement with transitional political arrangements 
is followed by an interim constitution, which precedes the final 
constitutional drafting stage
Transitional 
political 
arrangements
Final constitutionInterim constitution
This sequencing pattern involves a peace agreement with transitional political 
arrangements (often preceded by earlier ceasefire/pace agreements) that are followed 
by an interim constitution and then a final constitution. Three political settlement 
processes (Burundi, Central African Republic and Rwanda) have broadly followed this 
pattern, and similar sequencing has taken place in the distinctive internationalized 
cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The pattern of using both transitional political arrangements and an interim constitution 
usually occurs in countries (a) that have experienced prolonged internal strife, due 
to structural grievances and the unmet need for far-reaching reforms among some 
sectors of society; (b) with a weak or non-existent institutional framework incapable of 
ending the conflict; and (c) where incremental constitutional processes have been seen 
as a way to concurrently broker political and constitutional settlements. Transitional 
political arrangements are put in place to provide some sort of consultative structural 
administration. The interim constitution is put in place in order to: (a) enable further 
staging, often towards elections to a constituent body; (b) give the conflicted parties 
time to negotiate a political settlement to underpin the constitution-building process; 
and (c) enable stronger ties to be built with the conflicted parties’ constituencies and the 
population at large (Zulueta-Fülscher 2015: 28). However, the case studies illustrate 
that these constitution-making processes have had varied success. 
After the assassination in October 1993 of Burundi’s first democratically elected Hutu 
president, Melchior Ndadaye, the country descended into violence (Wolpe 2011). 
Attempts to bring the country back on track included the adoption of a number 
of (attempted) ceasefire agreements, peace agreements and transitional political 
arrangements. A transitional political arrangement was adopted in 1994 (which was 
invalidated after a coup in 1996) and an interim constitution in 1998, followed by the 
2000 Arusha Accord (a peace agreement), a second interim constitution in 2001, and 
finally the adoption of a new ‘interim’ constitution in 2004, which was then confirmed 
in the permanent constitution of 2005. Regional pressure was key to overcoming some 
parties’ lukewarm acceptance (and implementation) of the agreements, and drove the 
process towards the final constitution. This constitution—consociational in nature—
reflected a more or less widely shared political settlement at the time, and seems to 
have been a key factor in reducing the violence (Reyntjens 2015) until 2015, when it 
resumed, in part as a consequence of a presidential attempt to amend the constitution 
to extend term limits (Kabumba 2015). 
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In the Central African Republic, a spike in violence in 2013 forced the parties to 
conclude a peace agreement with transitional political arrangements (11 January 
2013), which was quickly followed by an interim constitution (18 July 2013) and a 
final constitution (approved by referendum in December 2015)—all drafted by the 
Transitional National Council. While this process represents a significant achievement 
in a relatively short period of time, the security situation remains fragile, and there were 
stark limitations regarding public participation throughout the process. 
In Rwanda, two protocols on power sharing were made part of the 1993 Arusha Accords, 
which included an interim constitution. Despite the dramatic failure of the accords 
and the Rwandan genocide, the security situation was stabilized. The constitution-
building process only started in 2000, following a highly participatory process that 
culminated in the adoption of the final constitution in 2003 (Ankut 2005). However, 
the constitutional order was dominated by one side to the conflict, and marked by 
authoritarianism; in 2015 a constitutional revision removed presidential term limits.
Three states—first Kosovo, and later Afghanistan and Iraq—also used this type of 
sequencing after international conflict and regime change. These processes were ‘rooted 
in binding UN Security Council resolution, with international constitution brokering 
as a conflict resolution device’ (Bell 2006: 394). This brokering consisted of an initial 
international transitional administration (created or supported by a UN Security 
Council resolution), followed by an internationally led constitution-building process 
which moved from (initially consultative) transitional political arrangements, to 
interim constitution, to final constitution, all attempting to broker agreement between 
competing local groups (Bell 2006: 394). 
Kosovo started its political settlement process in 1999 after an international conflict 
between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Serbia that was focused 
on ending internal conflict between Albanians and Serbians within Kosovo. The 
UN established a transitional political arrangement, involving both an international 
transitional administration and domestic transitional political arrangements, initially 
as a consultation mechanism. The latter was based on the Rambouillet Peace Accord of 
23 February 1999, which the parties ultimately had failed to agree to (see also Weller 
1999). These arrangements were followed by an interim constitution, the Framework 
for Provisional Self-government (2001), which again incorporated elements of the 
Rambouillet process and UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Following the 2007 
(failed) Ahtisaari Plan, which attempted to agree a final Serbian–Albanian political 
settlement, Kosovar Albanians unilaterally declared independence and adopted a 
final constitution in 2008 that incorporated elements of the Ahtisaari proposals 
(International Court of Justice 2010). While violence has significantly receded, the 
state is still fragile and dependent on international development aid. 
International transitional administrations (which were initially consultative, see Bell 
2006: 394–95) were also installed in Afghanistan and Iraq parallel to domestic 
transitional political arrangements, and interim constitutions were put in place in an 
attempt to heal internal divisions left in the wake of the deposed regimes and broker 
future agreements. Key domestic actors associated with the interstate conflict that 
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preceded the internal reconstruction—including the Taliban in Afghanistan and the 
Baath party in Iraq—were marginalized or excluded from the peace- and constitution-
building process, which had long-term consequences for the process.
The advantage of this sequencing is that it enables the immediate formation of a 
government where there is none, and an ongoing incremental process that attempts 
to produce a constitutional text that reflects a political settlement. However, the cases 
generally reflect the difficulties associated with forging a constitutional settlement and 
establishing agreed political and legal institutions in deeply divided societies (most 
often on ethnic grounds) that have suffered large-scale conflict. Due to the nature of 
the conflicts they seek to resolve, these processes have involved considerable fluctuation 
back and forth from relative peace into conflict and division. While they have been able 
to produce a constitutional text, these texts often do not reflect agreement across the 
country’s divisions, and thus struggle to be effective. 
Countries still differ, and no single model necessarily 
leads to success
To some extent, the examples indicate that sequences are not simply ‘chosen’, but 
are fashioned to respond to what are understood to be the unique conflict resolution 
imperatives in each context. However, they also indicate that a critical issue is the 
relationship between the peace process, the constitution-making process and the 
underlying process of agreement between key decision-makers—sometimes including 
armed groups, and society at large—to a new political settlement. The examples also 
begin to show a set of difficult sequencing choices and trade-offs. We explore these 
further in three very difficult and stark contexts in the next chapter.
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4. Case studies: learning from 
challenging processes
This chapter analyses three highly complex cases—Libya, Somalia and Yemen—which 
have not yet resulted in a final constitution. These cases point to the difficulty of 
reaching a final constitution that reflects a broadly shared political settlement in the 
relative absence of a political settlement between political and military elites who have 
the capacity to destabilize. They are part of a bigger group of countries (which includes 
Eritrea, South Sudan and Sudan) that have not yet managed to bring the political 
settlement process to fruition, partly due to new and/or mutating conflicts, but are still 
functioning under an interim constitution. 
Libya, Somalia and Yemen were chosen for in-depth analysis due to the complexity of 
the sequencing and their potential comparative value to the ongoing process in Syria. 
Their political settlement processes also share important intrinsic differences in terms 
of the armed conflict dynamics, degree and nature of international involvement, and 
the relationship between the constitution-building and political settlement processes. 
Libya 
The sequence of the process in post-Gaddafi Libya was intended to involve an 
interim constitution that would lead to elections for the General National Congress, 
followed by a constitution-making process to lead to a final constitution—roughly 
corresponding to the third sequencing pattern, but with no ceasefire/peace agreement. 
This process broke down in large part due to the failure to broker such a political 
settlement while pressing ahead with elections and the constitution-building process. 
While a comprehensive description of the situation is beyond the scope of this paper, 
this section highlights some of the sequencing dilemmas or trade-offs that need to be 
addressed if similar difficult situations are to be better handled in the future. 
From unstable peace to open conflict: the 2011 revolution and the 
attempt to reach a new political settlement
On 15 February 2011 the Arab Spring uprising spread to Libya, ultimately attracting an 
international force and displacing Muammar Gaddafi’s authoritarian regime, which had 
been in place since 1969 (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr 2015). After 42 years of Gaddafi 
rule, and no history of elections, state institutions were very weak (or non-existent). 
Hence, a new constitution was a necessary first step towards establishing post-revolution 
social or legal order. On 3 August 2011, while fighting was still ongoing, a National 
Transitional Council (NTC) formed as an interim administration of regime opponents 
comprising dissidents, lawyers and academics, which the international community 
recognized as the Libyan state authority. It adopted the Draft Constitutional Charter 
for the Transitional Stage (‘Constitutional Declaration’), which established the NTC as 
the highest authority of the state ‘until the election of the General National Congress 
(GNC)’ (article 30). This charter operated as a form of interim constitution but its 
provisions were very basic, and it did not attempt to regulate the security or judicial 
sectors.
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The Constitutional Declaration directed the NTC to adopt a statute regulating the 
election of the GNC, appoint the National High Commission on Elections and call 
for elections before 240 days after the declaration of liberation. The Declaration also 
stipulated that the GNC should designate a prime minister and choose a constitutive 
body to draft the constitution (article 30), which would have 60 days to present a 
draft constitution to the GNC for approval, and then 30 additional days to hold a 
referendum, which would need to be passed by a two-thirds majority of voters. 
The role of elections within the broader political settlement process
Elections for the GNC were held in July 2012, after which the NTC transferred its 
authority to the newly elected legislative body. However, rather than let the GNC 
appoint the members of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA), the NTC 
amended the Constitutional Declaration to provide that they should be directly elected 
by the people. In contrast to the proportional make-up of the GNC, the CDA would 
include 20 members from each of the three provinces—Cyrenaica (East), Tripolitania 
(North-West) and Fezzan (South-West). This procedure favoured the smaller 
populations of Cyrenaica and Fezzan in relation to the larger population of Tripolitania 
(60 per cent of the total population), enabling negotiation and compromise between 
their substantially different positions regarding federalism, unitary state and minority 
rights, respectively (Gluck 2015: 45). The CDA also reserved six seats for women, and 
two seats for each of the three minority groups (the Tebu, Toureg and Amazigh). These 
three groups, however, decided to boycott the CDA—arguably because they did not 
obtain enough seats in the CDA and felt marginalized (Libya Channel 2016). 
On 20 February 2014 elections were held to constitute the CDA at a time when 
political and security alliances were extremely fluid. While the CDA was trying to 
meet its 19 August 2014 deadline for a final constitutional draft, a delegitimized GNC 
decided to call for early legislative elections to a new House of Representatives (HoR), 
which were held in June 2014. These elections, not foreseen in the Constitutional 
Declaration, had a record low turnout but saw key former GNC members lose out 
(Eljarh 2014a) further exacerbating divisions in the country. 
On 6 November 2014 the Supreme Court ruled, in a controversial judgement, that ‘the 
HoR was illegal and unconstitutional’, as the electoral process and the constitutional 
amendment that made it possible ‘did not follow the proper protocol’ (Reuters 2014). 
The HoR—supported as the legitimate government by the international community 
and faced with a deteriorating security situation—moved to the eastern city of Tobruk, 
while former members of the GNC established a rival government in Tripoli. So the 
country had two putative governments, each able to assert a form of legal legitimacy and 
each allied with different armed actors (Eljarh 2014b; Reuters 2014; Maghur 2014). 
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The relationship between new attempts at political settlement and 
the existing constitutional process
On 24 March 2015 the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) proposed a six-
point deal including a framework for a government of national unity. This and later 
attempts to broker a political agreement were not accepted by the parties to the conflict 
until 17 December 2015. On that day, representatives of the HoR and GNC—as well 
as important public figures from Libyan political parties, civil society, municipalities 
and women’s groups—signed the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), which included 
a framework for a Government of National Accord (GNA) (UN News Centre 2015). 
This framework was in essence a second interim constitution, outlining a process 
towards a final constitution as part of a new effort to broker a political settlement. At 
the same time, the relationship between the LPA and the Constitutional Declaration 
is ambiguous, also in terms of legal supremacy (see Annex 4). The LPA affirmed the 
HoR as the ‘legislative authority of the State’ during the transitional period despite 
the Supreme Court ruling, but amended its competencies (article 12). At the same 
time, the LPA contains ‘interim security arrangements’, which include ceasefire 
arrangements and a provision for the GNA to establish a ‘Committee for Monitoring 
the Implementation of the Interim Security Arrangements’ (article 37). The process 
leading to the LPA, however, excluded negotiations with the various armed groups, 
which are expected to abide by (but have not officially adhered to) the agreement. 
In other words, while the LPA contains all the elements of a ceasefire agreement, the 
agreement has not been negotiated with all of the affected parties. 
In March 2016, the UN backed the formation of the GNA, but as of September 2016 
the GNA still needed to gather broad-based support in order to sustain itself as the 
legitimate government of Libya. However the ‘two regimes’ situation has not ended, as 
the HoR has yet to carry out the vote of confidence to approve the GNA, as mandated 
in the LPA (Reuters 2016b). 
In the meantime, the CDA continued drafting a final constitution (UN Constitutional 
2015; see also LPA article 48). However, changes to the process further affected its 
perceived legitimacy. For example, close to the deadline for a final draft—24 March 
2016 (only three months after the LPA was signed)—the UN supported the CDA 
holding three weeks of consultative meetings in Oman. Some members boycotted 
these meetings, thus the CDA could not meet its legal quorum when it voted on the 
draft constitution (Libya Channel 2016; Libya Observer 2016). Moving ahead anyway, 
the CDA missed the deadline specified in the LPA, but did not incur the consequences 
detailed in the agreement. The draft constitution was sent only to the HoR on 26 April 
2016, and has not been widely shared or discussed among the general public (Libyan 
Gazette 2016). Although welcomed by UNSMIL, the draft constitution continues to 
be opposed by the CDA members who boycotted the final drafting process in Oman 
(Libya Prospect 2016). While it is unclear whether the constitutional draft will be able 
to rally support within and outside the CDA, and among the public at large, the latter 
appears increasingly unlikely, especially given the very volatile situation on the ground 
(Gluck 2015: 48). 
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Engaging or fighting the spoilers in order to increase the legitimacy 
of the political settlement process
There are many potential spoilers in this political settlement process, including the 
myriad of armed groups that decision-makers do not seem to be willing (or able) to 
negotiate with. The Libyan affiliate of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also 
known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) has since 2014 and until recently 
taken advantage of the general chaos emanating from the lack of strong government 
and security institutions in the country—and the division of the country into rival 
parliaments, governments and military coalitions—to carve out space and grow (El 
Amrani 2016). While ISIS has become the one actor against which every other actor 
could theoretically unite, authorities in the east and west have been more focused on 
undermining each other, and thereby the political settlement process, than on fighting 
ISIS. 
Preliminary conclusions
The Libyan context is complex: it was always likely to be extremely challenging to bring 
about a constitutional democratic order after such a long period of authoritarianism 
and institutional disintegration. The transition unravelled the relationship between 
the political settlement and the constitution-making process, which meant that the 
constitution-making process became a contested battleground in which emergent 
post-Gaddafi divisions were deepened rather than resolved. This happened for two 
main reasons. First, not all stakeholders in the process had a voice at the negotiating 
table, especially when the text of the interim constitution was being discussed, which 
obstructed the formation of a political settlement between the relevant groups (Al-
Ali 2011). Second, the disadvantage associated with this form of sequencing—that 
too much of the political settlement is left to be resolved in the constitution-making 
processes—was exacerbated by the creation of a separate constitution-making body, the 
CDA, under a different representational logic to the politicians and without any formal 
links to the rest of the political settlement process.
Furthermore, the timescales set out in the initial Constitutional Declaration exacerbated 
the emergent post-Gaddafi political divisions. Repeated elections also arguably 
destabilized the situation, as most parties to the conflict perceived them as zero-sum 
games. The ensuing difficulties point to the need to better understand the trade-offs 
between the requirement to move fast in order to stabilize a difficult political situation 
by providing it with functional and legitimate institutions, on the one hand, and the 
requirement to take time to develop underlying political consent to those institutions, 
particularly where new conflicts appear to be emerging, on the other hand. 
Somalia
Somalia initially also followed the third sequencing pattern, but its experience indicates 
the difficulty of fashioning a national political settlement in a context of open conflict 
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where there are distinct political settlement requirements at the sub-state level to which 
central state institutions cannot respond. 
Within a decade of independence in 1960, Somalia was subjected to a military coup 
that resulted in the long rule of Major General Siad Barre. Opposition to his rule grew 
in the 1980s, resulting in his overthrow in 1991, after which Somalia descended into 
clan-based civil war.8 Somaliland—in the northwest—declared independence in 1991 
and initiated a constitution-building process that culminated in 2000; Puntland—
in the northeast—agreed autonomous governance structures in 1998. While the UN 
negotiated several ceasefire agreements, none of them ended the violence. After the UN 
withdrew from Somalia in March 1995, there were a number of attempts to negotiate 
agreements between the factions, but none succeeded (Saalax and Ibrahim 2010). 
Peace agreements and the first interim constitution 
From May to August 2000, parties to the Somali National Peace Conference, held 
in Arta (Djibouti), adopted the Arta Declaration—a peace agreement that included 
transitional government structures. The declaration established the Transitional National 
Government, the Transitional National Parliament and the Transitional National 
Charter—a ‘transitional political agreement’ that provided the legal framework for the 
emerging government (Atta-Asamoah 2013, 2). Somalia aimed to become a unitary 
state with a strong government, and 18 administrative regions (Bryden 2013: 20). 
While the governing framework agreed at Arta initially contributed to some form of 
negative peace and was backed by the UN and a loose coalition of Arab and African 
states, it was opposed by the newly created and Ethiopia-backed Somalia Reconciliation 
and Restoration Council, which supported a federal structure for Somalia (Saalax and 
Ibrahim 2010). The conflict resumed.
In October 2002, another reconciliation conference, supported by the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development, resulted in the signing of the Eldoret 
Declaration—a peace agreement that again included transitional political arrangements, 
but which stipulated ‘the need to create a federal structure, reversing the unitary 
structure established at Arta’ (Saalax and Ibrahim 2010). As a result, in August 2004 
a 275-member Transitional Federal Parliament and Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) replaced the Transitional National Parliament and Transitional National 
Government and adopted a new Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) as an interim 
constitution. This was the first time Somalia was officially declared a federal republic. 
The Arta and Eldoret declarations both attempted to build more inclusive institutions 
that would be better able to respond to the needs and demands of the public. They 
provided that the new transitional structures were to be selected using the so-called 
4.5-formula of representation, whereby an equal number of places were reserved for 
8 Somalia’s clan-based society features four main clans—Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Rahaweyn—and several minor 
clans. Clans constitute family lineages that are in turn divided by sub-clans. The latter might build (temporary) 
alliances for warfare (Schmidt 2015).
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the four major clans—Hawiye, Darod, Dir and Rahaweyn—with the remaining 0.5 
reserved for smaller clan groups and women. However, the representativeness of this 
formula was increasingly questioned, as were the resulting governments, which were 
marred by partisan infighting and a general perception of ineffectiveness (ICG 2008: 
2).
Unrealistic deadlines and attempts to move forward with the 
political settlement process
The TFG was mandated to federate Somalia (article 11, paragraph 8) and prepare a 
national federal constitution in 2.5 years (article 71, paragraph 9)—in hindsight at 
least, an unrealistic deadline. The concept of federalism was still very contentious, and 
its imposition aggravated pre-existing tensions and contributed to hardening positions 
between contending groups (Bryden 2013, 21). A new wave of violence erupted 
between the TFG government and Islamic groups in 2006, and despite the inclusion 
of some of these groups in government structures, and the extension of the TFG’s 
mandate, new violence broke out in 2009; the constitution-making process remained 
stalled. 
By September 2011, after two years of insurgency war, the TFG was deeply delegitimized 
and the constitutional process significantly delayed. At the strong urging of the UN 
and development partners, the TFG adopted the Roadmap to End the Transition—a 
transitional political agreement that stipulated priority tasks to end the transition 
before 20 August 2012, including security, a constitution, reconciliation and good 
governance. 
In December 2011 and February 2012, the TFG met with other Somali stakeholders 
in Garowe (Puntland) to agree on what has been called the Garowe I and Garowe II 
Principles. These principles were to further systematize the process of federalization, 
the drafting of the post-transition constitution, the formation of the post-transition 
federal parliament and the design of the electoral system.9 Both documents stressed the 
need to finalize a draft constitution by 20 April 2012, with the transition ending no 
later than 20 August 2012. 
Competing constitution-drafting processes and the second interim 
constitution
The TFC created an Independent Federal Constitutional Commission (IFCC) tasked 
with drafting the constitution, but was slow to advance amid worsening conflict 
dynamics. After the 2011 roadmap was signed, the TFG set up a new Committee of 
Experts (CoE) to produce a draft constitution. Despite tensions between the IFCC 
and CoE, in part because the two bodies had competing views on what the political 
9 In the March 2012 Galkayo Agreement, key stakeholders conceded that the post-transition federal parliament 
would be selected using the 4.5 formula instead of a new electoral system (Atta-Asamoah 2013: 8; Ainte 2014: 
64).
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settlement should look like, they eventually produced a single draft text (Ainte 2014). 
By that stage, however, the minister for constitutional affairs had established a Technical 
Review Committee, which produced its own competing text. These documents were 
eventually merged into a single compromise draft constitution, which left key sections 
incomplete—most notably the division of powers and resources between the federal 
government and sub-state units. 
In June 2012 the TFG established the Somali National Constituent Assembly, an 
825-member body (with 30 per cent of the seats reserved for women)—nominated 
by 135 traditional leaders, again using the 4.5 formula—in charge of reviewing and 
endorsing the final draft constitution (Atta-Asamoah 2013: 4; Ainte 2014: 62). In 
record time, the Constituent Assembly endorsed the Provisional Constitution (PC) to 
replace the TFC in July 2012 as a second interim constitution. The new constitution 
set a deadline of August 2016 to: (a) negotiate a final document to be approved by 
referendum (article 132 (10)), (b) hold national elections (article 136); and (c) establish 
federal states (article 49; see next section) and an upper house of parliament thereafter. 
A new parliament was inaugurated in August 2012, and the president was elected in 
September 2012, replacing the TFG with the Federal Government of Somalia. Since 
that time, despite attempts to establish principles to move the constitution-building 
process forward, such as the 2013 New Deal and the Vision 2016 frameworks, the 
process has remained behind schedule.
Constitution-building at the sub-state level
Article 48 of the PC establishes that none of the 18 pre-1991 administrative regions 
is to stand alone; they are required to merge to form Federal Member States (FMS). 
Realities on the ground, including the late establishment of the Boundaries and 
Federation Commission in July 2015 (Goobjoog News 2015), have forced the federal 
government to work directly with regional stakeholders on state formation processes. 
An interesting but unorthodox situation has emerged in which regional states have 
been created for a federal structure that is not fully delimited or established at the 
national level. Nevertheless, the results have been relatively positive (Crouch 2016) in 
that the post-PC period has seen the emergence of three additional Interim Regional 
Administrations in South and Central Somalia (Hosh 2016). There are only three 
regions left to merge: two are currently in the process of merging, while the last one, 
surrounding Mogadishu, might require a constitutional reform to allow it to stand 
alone as an FMS or a federal district under central administration.
The FMS formation process illustrates that where localized peacebuilding has been 
more successful than national peacebuilding, sub-state political settlement processes 
may have a role in contributing to the national-level process by building the state from 
below. 
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Seeking to enhance representation via a new electoral system 
The design of the electoral model contemplated in the 2012 PC has also suffered 
setbacks and delays. In July 2015, the federal government and federal parliament 
officially recognized that, contrary to what was envisioned in the PC, ‘one-person, 
one-vote’ elections would not be possible in 2016 (ConstitutionNet 2016). A new 
model would need to be designed to ensure broader inclusion and representation, 
short of holding fully fledged elections. Hence a National Consultative Forum was put 
in place—later named the National Leaders Forum—that decided on a mechanism 
whereby 135 traditional elders would select 275 Electoral Colleges of 50 members 
each, which would in turn elect the 275 members of the lower house of parliament. 
While this political agreement declared that the federal parliament would have to 
endorse both the 2016 electoral model and its implementation, on 22 May 2016 
the president issued a decree legalizing the electoral proceedings agreed upon by the 
National Leaders Forum. The decree was allegedly in response to the federal parliament 
again failing to vote on the political agreement, and was supported by the international 
community despite criticisms (Uluso 2016; UN Security Council 2016). 
Spoilers of the political settlement process and their potential 
representativeness
As the original conflict has mutated, Al-Shabaab has become the main protagonist 
in the country’s protracted civil conflict. While not a party to the political settlement 
process, the Al-Shabaab jihadist movement has been the main beneficiary of the process’ 
lack of credibility. Al-Shabaab was founded in 2004, the year the TFC was adopted. 
It rose within the Union Islamic Courts, especially when the latter took control of 
Mogadishu in 2006. From 2007–09 it assisted in the uprising against the Ethiopian 
intervention fighting Islamist groups, and expanded its territorial control. From 2009 
to 2011 the strengthened African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) forced Al-
Shabaab to retreat from territory it had gained since 2006, notably from Mogadishu 
in August 2011 (ICG 2014a: 9). While the continued military campaign against Al-
Shabaab has significantly weakened it (Mosley 2015: 15; Bryden and Thomas 2015: 
7; LPI 2014: 18), it has managed to regroup in small towns in the south and central 
parts of Somalia; since late 2015, Al-Shabaab has engaged the AMISOM-led coalition 
in large-scale attacks, resulting in scores of deaths on both sides. Al-Shabaab’s strength, 
however, lies in its capacity to claim that it is not only an armed insurgency but also a 
social movement (ICG 2014a: 1). 
Preliminary conclusions
The Somali process is complex and has unique challenges. In particular, it illustrates 
the tension between time and legitimacy. While the TFC—as the first interim 
constitution—represented an elite pact between the major clans, it was incomplete—
necessitating a long, drawn-out period of constitutional negotiations. As the process 
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went on, the elite pact was never expanded to allow for broader-based societal support, 
which contributed to a rapid delegitimization of the process and the national elites that 
played into the hands of emerging spoiler groups. 
The Somalia case also illustrates how spoiler groups can disrupt political settlement 
processes, in particular by taking advantage of legitimacy gaps that are sometimes 
inherent in elite pacts, and carving out an alternative type of legitimacy therein. Al-
Shabaab ignited a separate conflict with the government that was not addressed in the 
ongoing political settlement process, and helped make it impossible to hold elections 
or undertake a more participatory constitution-building process—thus preventing the 
process from strengthening its legitimacy. 
However, sub-state political settlements have recently developed during the FMS 
formation processes. The hope is that these settlements may contribute to building the 
legitimacy of the political settlement in the absence of one-person-one-vote elections 
or a more participatory constitution-building process.
Yemen
In Yemen, a transitional political arrangement and the equivalent of an interim 
constitution were signed on the same day, giving way to a constitution-building process. 
Ideally, Yemen would have followed the fourth sequencing pattern, but changing 
conflict dynamics disrupted the political settlement process by adding a peace process 
to the ongoing constitutional process. 
In January 2011, Yemenis began protesting against President Saleh’s authoritarian 
regime. The turning point for Saleh was 18 March 2011, when security forces killed 
around 50 demonstrators and injured approximately 200. Key members of his 
government started defecting, and he began to lose the support of long-time allies. The 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—a body comprised of a number of countries on the 
Arab Peninsula except Yemen—started immediately drafting the GCC Agreement, the 
primary goal of which was ‘to end the impasse begun after the Arab Spring protests of 
2011 by putting an end to the rule of Yemen’s long-time president Ali Abdullah Saleh’ 
(Al-Muslimi 2014). This agreement was adopted together with the Implementation 
Mechanism for the Transition Process.
A planned political settlement process in two phases
The Implementation Mechanism for the Transition Process established a transition in 
two phases. The first phase started with the mechanism’s entry into force, and was to 
end with early presidential elections and the inauguration of a new president. President 
Saleh resigned from his post 30 days after the agreement (having been granted immunity 
from prosecution), and Vice President Hadi became interim president. The opposition 
then nominated the prime minister, Hadi and the opposition created a government 
of national unity, and early presidential elections were called within 90 days of Saleh 
signing the GCC Agreement and the Implementation Mechanism. These early 
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elections confirmed Hadi as president, after which he had to establish a Constitutional 
Committee ‘to oversee the preparation of the new constitution’ (GCC, quoted in 
Lackner 2016: 71). The first phase also included the establishment of a Committee 
on Military Affairs for Achieving Security and Stability, which was supposed to end 
divisions within the armed forces and conflict with other armed groups, and integrate 
the latter under a unified national leadership. These goals were never fully realized 
(Lackner 2016).
The second phase should have lasted two years, starting with the inauguration of 
President Hadi following early presidential elections, and ending with general elections 
held under the framework of a new constitution. This new constitution was to be the 
result of discussions held at the National Dialogue Conference (NDC)—a forum of 
565 participants including representatives of political parties as well as representatives 
of the Southern Movement, the Huthis, women, youth and civil society actors 
(Implementation Mechanism, article 20; Transfeld 2015). The new constitution was 
to be drafted within three months by a Constitutional Commission, established within 
six months after the conclusion of the NDC’s work. The draft constitution would be 
approved by referendum, followed by parliamentary and (perhaps also) presidential 
elections within three months of the adoption of the new constitution. These were 
hugely ambitious (and unrealistic) deadlines. 
The NDC started work on 18 March 2013, and was to last until September 2013. It 
concluded on 25 January 2014 after missing several deadlines (Holzapfel 2014: 6). It 
was tasked with discussing and establishing working groups for a number of issues, 
including the question of autonomy for the southern provinces; specific interests and 
tensions with the Sa’ada (Huthi); national reconciliation and transitional justice; state-
building; good governance; military and security issues; the independence of special 
entities; rights and freedoms; and development issues (Hassan 2014; Gaston 2014). The 
NDC’s final report included more than 1,800 decisions, but failed to reach agreement 
on a number of major issues, notably the number of regions to be included in the 
future federal state, the southern question, transitional justice, military reform and the 
membership of the Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC) (Lackner 2016: 45). 
A Consensus Committee was created to make progress in these areas, but was similarly 
unsuccessful (Salisbury 2015: 19). 
Regarding the country’s future federal structure, the president established an ‘8+8’ 
or ‘North/South Committee’—with 16 representatives including both Huthis and 
southerners—which reached consensus on the fact that Yemen would be a federal state 
with greater autonomy for the regions. However, the committee was unable to agree 
on the type of financial, administrative and political devolution, or on the number of 
regions Yemen would be divided into (Gluck 2015: 51; Gaston 2014: 4). President 
Hadi then appointed a 23-member Regions Committee tasked with determining the 
number of regions in a federal state, the decisions of which would be (expedient and) 
final. After less than two weeks, the Regions Committee announced on 10 February 
2014 that the country was to be constituted by six regions—four in the north, and two 
in the south (BBC News 2014). While the committee’s final report included the option 
to review the borders of each region after at least one electoral cycle, both the Huthis 
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and the southern separatists rejected the distribution up front (Gaston 2014: 4). The 
Huthis wanted access to the sea and natural resources, and the southern separatists—or 
at least those represented in the talks—wanted a single region (Salisbury 2015: 18). 
Constitutional drafting and the resumption of conflict
On 8 March 2014 the Hadi administration established the CDC with Presidential 
Decree no. 26. This decree notably limited the options available to the CDC by 
defining the Republic of Yemen as a federal state comprising six regions pursuant 
to the final report of the Regions Committee (article 2), ignoring both Huthis’ and 
southerners’ discontent. The decree once again established a very tight timeline, calling 
for a referendum on the draft constitution to be held less than a year from the date of 
the appointment of the members of the commission (article 6), which left insufficient 
time for a public consultation campaign that should have taken place upon publication 
of the draft constitution (article 29). A public consultation campaign might have 
increased the credibility of both the CDC, as an appointed body in charge of drafting 
the new constitution, and the draft constitution, as at least partially responding to the 
needs and demands of the broader population. 
On 24 April 2014 President Hadi established the National Authority for the 
Implementation of the Outcomes of the NDC by decree; this body included 82 former 
NDC members on a voluntary (unpaid) basis (Lackner 2016: 48) and was charged 
with supervising the CDC. The authority ‘soon became part of the increasingly tense 
struggle between the transitional regime and the Huthis’ (Lackner 2016: 48), as the 
Huthis did not feel their increasing power was properly reflected in their representation 
in the new organization. In the meantime, conflict escalated: the Huthis, who had 
supported the uprisings against the Saleh regime in 2011, expanded their territorial 
control well beyond their home governorate of Sa’ada, in Yemen’s northeast, reaching 
the capital Sana’a in September 2014. 
On 21 September 2014 all parties to the conflict signed the Peace and National 
Partnership Agreement that stipulated the formation of a new government—still headed 
by President Hadi—as well as the development of a plan to implement the outcomes 
of some of the NDC’s working groups, specifically those dealing with Sa’ada and the 
Southern issue (Yemen Times 2014). In parallel with the attempted implementation of 
the Partnership Agreement, the CDC devised a draft constitution that divided Yemen 
into six federal regions. As expected, the Huthis refused to endorse it, and staged a coup 
against Hadi’s government on 6 February 2015. The Huthis’ increased power vis-à-vis 
the regime then allowed them to dissolve parliament and declare ‘that a five-member 
presidential council would be formed and that a Supreme Revolutionary Committee 
would temporarily run the country’ (UN Department of Political Affairs n.d.). 
42      International IDEA
International IDEA
Peace talks and attempts to put the political settlement back on 
track
The original political settlement process and constitutional drafting process have been 
outpaced by a mutating conflict. Since March 2015 Yemen has suffered an increasingly 
virulent civil war, primarily between the Huthis (assisted by Saleh’s military forces in 
an unlikely marriage of convenience) and an even more unlikely alliance between a 
weakened Hadi GNU, Southern separatists, Sunni Islamists and other adversaries 
to the Huthi/Saleh bloc (ICG 2016a: 12), supported by a Saudi-led international 
coalition. The civil war soon became a proxy war, in which the rivalry between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran provided ‘the geostrategic context in which Yemeni domestic battles 
are unfolding [both camps assisted by either of these regional powers], serving to 
polarize and radicalize an already difficult situation’ (ICG 2016a: 26). The civil war 
also suspended the negotiations, and all international UN staff withdrew from Yemen. 
It was not until June 2015 that, under strong international pressure, the first round of 
peace talks was held in Geneva; only in the second round in December 2015 did the 
parties start to negotiate on substantive issues, such as humanitarian access, confidence-
building, a durable ceasefire and holding a further meeting in early 2016 (ICG 2016b: 
28). Between the rounds, UN-facilitated consultations took place in Oman, where 
both sides to the conflict slowly recognized the need for political talks and an end 
to violence. On 15 December 2015 the Saudi-led coalition announced a seven-day 
ceasefire, which was accepted by the Huthis but immediately broken by both sides 
to the conflict (ICG 2016a); the ceasefire officially ended on 2 January 2016. UN-
sponsored peace talks scheduled for 14 January 2016 were postponed; the military 
stalemate continued between both parties to the conflict, and both IS and al-Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula further expanded their military operations throughout Yemen 
(ICG 2016a’). Another ceasefire entered into force on 11 April 2016—although 
fighting continued—and peace talks started in Kuwait on 22 April 2016 after the 
Huthis confirmed their participation ‘following assurances that pro-government forces 
would respect a ceasefire’ (Al Jazeera 2016), although they broke down shortly after 
(Reuters 2016a). 
Even if a given ceasefire agreement is respected (which has not been the case up until 
September 2016), and peace talks lead to a new political settlement process, one of 
the key questions is what to do with the January 2015 draft constitution. Should it be 
ignored and replaced, be the subject of a public consultation campaign, amended and/
or voted upon via referendum?
Preliminary conclusions
The Yemen example, like that of Somalia and Libya, illustrates the difficulty of 
constitution-building in the absence of a commitment to a broadly agreed (if basic) 
political settlement framework. The NDC was not able to resolve the numerous 
disagreements on the parameters of the political settlement, and could have been 
more useful in a consultative role (Lackner 2016). The attempt to proceed with the 
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constitution-building process without an underlying political agreement shifted the 
burden to this process, which it could not deliver on, and forced the president to 
make decisions without broad-based support from all stakeholders, crucially on the 
country’s federal division. Therefore the process was soon outpaced by a new phase of 
conflict, including proxy war dynamics, that further destabilized the fragile political 
settlement that had begun to be institutionalized during the first phase of the GCC 
process (Lackner 2016: 61; Hassan 2014: 51; Carlino 2014), forcing the parties to start 
the political settlement process all over again. 
Preliminary conclusions from the case studies
Somalia, Yemen and Libya illustrate, in different ways, the complexity of constitution-
building as a way of brokering agreement on a new power map for the state where there 
is virtually none. Constitutions usually rest on a common commitment to: a particular 
territorial configuration of the state, core values and a political community. However, 
in these conflict-affected cases, there is often little (or no) underlying agreement about 
the political settlement or the process leading up to it, and the constitution-making 
process is likely to be repeatedly superseded by conflict and further peace processes. 
These three case studies illustrate how the specific sequencing pattern that should be 
used in a political settlement process, especially in fragile and conflict-affected settings, 
is heavily determined by contextual factors, such as: 
• the nature and scale of the conflict;
• the types of actors that are involved (or excluded);
• the degree to which the conflict (or previous regime) weakened the institutional 
framework;
• the types and intensity of international interventions; and
• the emergence of critical junctures that might support or threaten to derail the 
process completely.
As a result, in the most complex cases a political settlement that emerges through a 
linear progression from peace agreements to transitional political arrangements to a 
final constitution is very much the exception rather than the norm. More often, peace 
and constitution-making processes move through iterative interim stages, and only a 
few reach a final constitution that reflects a broadly shared political settlement; others 
fall apart as conflict dynamics change.
The following general dynamics characterize the terrain in the 23 cases analysed in this 
paper, and particularly the cases of Libya, Somalia and Yemen: 
1. The existing consensus from which to develop a constitution is sometimes so 
incomplete that it leaves out certain key groups that then can destabilize the 
constitution-building process. 
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2. The political vacuum resulting from limited political agreement may give rise to 
new conflicts and political groupings that may undo any agreements reached so 
far. 
3. New political allegiances may start to create a new negotiation process that becomes 
layered on top of the constitution-making process in ways that undermine or 
replace it. 
4. A robust participative process operating with insufficient buy-in from the political 
power-holders can create a lot of energy and ideas for the constitution, but be 
frustrated by the lack of elite buy-in to the end result. 
5. The timetables agreed in ceasefires, peace agreements or interim arrangements 
may constrain the constitution-making process in ways that are not conducive to 
completing an effective constitutional framework.
6. It may be difficult to find mechanisms to break constitutional logjams, which 
by virtue of their close relationship to the peace process may require external 
mediation and pressure to resolve, but internationals may find it hard to assert the 
legitimacy to intervene. 
7. Where international actors play a key role, they may impose their own conditions 
on the trajectory. These conditions may be driven more by their domestic and 
ideological interests than by the requirements of effective constitutional practice. 
8. Sometimes international actors support local elites when they act unconstitutionally 
in order to ‘save’ the constitution-making process, but this undermines the idea of 
‘playing by the constitutional rules’ that internationals are trying to foster. 
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5. Conclusion: Managing the 
sequencing of peace agreements 
and constitutions
What, then, determines which sequencing trajectory is chosen, and to what extent do 
particular choices favour particular outcomes in terms of a stable political settlement 
and working constitutional order? 
It is very difficult to generalize. The four models explained above include transitions 
from conflict to peace that, while broadly grouped into generic sequencing patterns, 
also varied in a number of ways, including: (a) the length of the process, (b) the number 
of agreements attempted or needed, (c) the specific content of the agreements and, 
perhaps most critically, (d) the relationship between the constitution-making process 
and the political settlement process.
In South Africa, for instance, the specific sequence and related innovations were 
possible in part because of the emergence of a broadly accepted political settlement, 
which was primarily reflected in the interim constitution. In other conflict situations, 
such as Nepal, the constitution-building process has been used, in essence, to continue 
an incomplete negotiation, whereby the final constitutional process must continue to 
forge an agreement regarding the country’s government structures and state institutions, 
rather than merely turning a prior agreement into a good constitutional text. In other 
contexts, the lack of political agreement produces even more incremental processes 
of constitution-building, moving through transitional arrangements and interim 
constitutions to final constitutions. 
It is important to recognize from the outset that choices about sequencing are not 
driven by ‘best practice’, but more by ‘what is possible’. Table 5.1 indicates the types of 
short- and long-term requirements that determine sequencing and affect the chances 
of reaching a constitutional text capable of effectively coordinating the government 
and protecting citizens’ rights. The interaction between these requirements can have 
different implications for the type of political settlement process and sequencing model 
a country engages in. However, the case studies above indicate that occasionally (local 
as well as international) decision-makers push for a specific sequencing pattern in spite 
of the specific contextual factors, which make it unlikely to succeed, with potentially 
pernicious consequences. 
The dual effort to reach two goals—a political settlement between elites that is crucial 
to ending a conflict, and an effective constitutional order capable of sustaining and 
developing that settlement—is best thought of not in terms of a ‘best practice’ choice, 
but in terms of how it enables the management of a set of dilemmas on those short- and 
long-term requirements, which can also be understood as trade-offs. These trade-offs 
arise because agreement between warring parties is necessary for political settlement, 
but a broader set of more principled commitments is required for constitutional 
effectiveness and the rule of law; these contrasting requirements are sometimes in 
tension with each other. 
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Table 5.1. Short- and long-term requirements of political settlement
Short-term requirements Long-term requirements 
Negative peace: ending 
violence
Positive peace: fair and effective political and 
legal structures
An initial ‘deal’ among political 
elites: a strong and clear initial 
agreement on access to power, 
which will enable a transition
Flexible institutional arrangements: a set of 
arrangements that remain open and responsive 
to new needs for inclusion over time, and are 
not beholden to any specific individual or elite 
group
Speed: a quick commitment 
to a ceasefire and a new 
institutional framework
Time: a locally developed and owned set of legal 
and political institutions with sufficient consent 
to be effective
Elite inclusion: inclusion of 
main groups and interests
Societal inclusion: broad-based social 
participation and commitment to ‘the common 
good’
Clearly planning the inclusion 
or exclusion of key spoilers
Capacity to revise the inclusion or exclusion 
of spoilers in the constitutional settlement. 
Enabling ongoing constitutional development, 
which may require finding ways to include 
formerly excluded ‘spoilers’, or to exclude 
or limit the capacity of included spoilers to 
obstruct the process
International guarantees 
and enforcement: sufficient 
international commitment 
and enforcement of the initial 
deal to overcome reluctance to 
implement it
Locally owned processes and consent: 
constitutional orders that are relevant and 
effective for the people governed by them
The tension between the short-term demands of political settlement and longer-term 
needs requires carefully managing the trade-offs between the two. The sequencing 
options have different advantages and disadvantages in this sense, which can be built 
on (or mitigated against) if better understood. 
1. Creating necessary peace versus building sustainable peace. Some form of negative 
peace (Galtung 1969: 183)—or the absence of violence—is necessary before 
starting to negotiate a final constitutional arrangement. But while armed 
actors may want constitutional guarantees over access to power before they are 
prepared to leave the battlefield, for longer-term peace the constitutional order 
must be capable of being more than a ‘dirty deal’: it must reflect a broader set 
of constituencies and interests than armed actors can bring to the table. Staging 
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constitution-making through interim arrangements and/or interim constitutions 
can enable the balance between sufficient guarantees to armed actors and sufficient 
future capacity for the constitutional ‘deal’ to be broadened and deepened. 
However, it can also force the constitution-making process to bear the heavy 
burden of forging agreement over the fundamental parameters of the political 
settlement. 
2. Temporary agreement versus permanent text. There is also a tension between 
producing a constitutional agreement that is permanent enough that armed 
parties are fully committed to it and have sufficient guarantees, and leaving that 
document open to new processes of change in the future—including ongoing 
constitutional development. Sequencing approaches, and related timing issues, 
must try to balance (a) sufficient guarantees to politico-military actors for them 
to agree to stop fighting with (b) enough openness to enable a participatory 
constitution-building process over time. 
3. The requirement of speed versus the requirement to take time. Peace processes and 
constitutional moments often produce very short windows of time during which 
change is possible. However, constitutional development and broad constitutional 
inclusion takes time. The process must balance the speed required to put some 
transitional structures in place if needed, and the time needed for constitutional 
development. 
4. Participation versus elite pact. Political–military buy-in and broad participation are 
both important for the future implementation of the constitutional framework, 
and must be secured in different ways at different stages of the process. While 
elections and broad participation are understood by international actors to be 
the key guarantors of an inclusive constitution-making process, the success of 
such a process also depends on its capacity to capture and articulate the political 
settlement agreed by those at the main negotiating table. It is furthermore 
important to note the sometimes-tenuous link between political elites and armed 
groups in some of these settings. Efforts need to be made to ensure that what 
political elites agree to at the negotiating table also reflects or represents the needs 
and demands of armed groups, which may become spoilers to the process. 
5. Including and excluding spoilers. Depending on the nature and virulence of 
(potential) spoilers, plans might be needed to assess the consequences of including 
or excluding specific groups at specific points within the process in order to avoid 
derailment of the project, from within or from the outside. These plans might 
change as the process evolves, and as opportunities arise to include former spoilers 
or respond to the demands of their constituencies. 
6. International guarantees versus locally owned process. Depending on the status of 
the institutional framework, international guarantors might be needed to ensure 
compliance with the ceasefire or peace agreement. However, they may impose 
their own conditions on the process. For such an intervention to be effective, 
internationals will need to make sure they have legitimacy on the ground—that 
is, that agreements respond to (reasonable) local needs and demands.
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Annex A. Peace agreements
Afghanistan
Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment 
of the Permanent Government Institutions (Bonn Agreement), 5 December 2001
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Dayton Peace Agreement, 1995, <http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/
files/BA_951121_DaytonAgreement.pdf>
Bougainville (Papua New Guinea)
Charter of Mirigini for a New Bougainville, 1994, <http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/
peacemaker.un.org/files/PG_941125_The%20Charter%20of%20Mirigini%20
for%20a%20New%20Bougainville.pdf>
Bougainville Peace Agreement, 2001, <http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.
un.org/files/PG_010830_BougainvillePeaceAgreement.pdf>
Constitution of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville 2004, <http://www.paclii.
org/pg/constitution-bougainville-2004.html>
Burundi
UN Security Council, Agreement embodying the Convention on Governance, 
1994, <http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BI_940910_
AgreementEmbodyingConventionOnGovernance.pdf>
Interim Constitution, 1998, <http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/transitional_
national_constitution_and_transitional_constitution_act_1998-2001_0.pdf>
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (Arusha Accord), 2000, 
<http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BI_000828_Arusha%20
Peace%20and%20Reconciliation%20Agreement%20for%20Burundi.pdf>
Second Interim Constitution, 2001, <http://www.chr.up.ac.za/chr_old/hr_docs/
constitutions/docs/BurundiC(englishsummary).doc>
Final Constitution, 2005, <https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/
Burundi_2005.pdf>
Cambodia
UN Security Council, Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, 1991, 
<http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KH_911023_
FrameworkComprehensivePoliticalSettlementCambodia.pdf>
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Transitional National Charter (interim constitution), 1991, <http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/
constit/td1991.htm>
Central African Republic 
Political Accord of Libreville on the Resolution of the Political–Security Crisis in the 
Central African Republic, January 2013, <http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.
un.org/files/CF_130111_AccordPolitiqueDeLibreville.pdf>
Interim Constitution, July 2013, <http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/cf2013.htm>
Final Constitution, 2015, <http://www.sangonet.com/afriqg/PAFF/Dic/actuC/
ActuC19/projet-constitution-RCA-adopte-par-CNT-2015.pdf>
Comoros
Accord Cadre pour la Reconciliation aux Comores, 2001, <http://peacemaker.un.org/
sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KM_010217_Accord%20cadre%20pour%20la%20
reconciliation%20aux%20Comores%20%28Fomboni%29.pdf>
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Transitional Constitution, 1994, <http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/democratic_
republic_of_the_congo_drc_transitional_constitution_of_the_democratic_republic_
of_the_congo_1994-1997.pdf>
Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition, 2002, <http://www.constitutionnet.org/
files/transition_constitution_of_the_democratic_republic_of_the_congo_2003-2006.
pdf>
Constitution, 2006, <https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Democratic_
Republic_of_the_Congo_2011.pdf?lang=en>
Guinea
Ouagadougou Joint Declaration, 2010, <http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.
un.org/files/GN_100115_DeclarationConjointeOuagadougou.pdf>
Iraq
Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, 8 March 2004
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National Accord and Reconciliation Act, 2008, <http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/
pdfdownloads/Acts/NationalAccordandReconciliationAct_No4of2008.pdf>
Longer-term Issues and Solutions: Constitutional Review, <http://peacemaker.un.org/
sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KE_080304_Kenya%20National%20Dialogue%20
and%20Reconciliation-Longer%20Term%20Issues%20and%20Solutions%20
Constitutional%20Review.pdf>
Kosovo
Rambouillet Peace Accords, 1999, <http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.
un.org/files/990123_RambouilletAccord.pdf>
UN Security Council, Resolution 1244, 1999, (transitional political 
arrangement), <http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/990610_
SCR1244%281999%29.pd>
Interim Constitution, Framework for Provisional Self-government, 2001, <http://
www.assembly-kosova.org/common/docs/FrameworkPocket_ENG_Dec2002.pdf>
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (Ahtisaari Plan), 2007, 
<http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/Comprehensive%20Proposal%20.
pdf>
Final constitution, 2008, <https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/
Kosovo_2008.pdf>
Libya
Libyan Political Agreement, 17 December 2015, <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=miXuJYkQAQg%3D&tabid=3559&mid=6187&language
=en-US>, accessed 16 March 2016
Draft Constitutional Charter for the Transitional Stage (Constitutional Declaration), 
2011, <https://www.ndi.org/files/Handout%204%20-%20Libya%20Draft%20
Interim%20Constitution.pdf>, accessed 10 March 2016 
Madagascar
Constitution, 2010, <https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/
Madagascar_2010.pdf>
Roadmap for Ending the Crisis in Madagascar, 2011, <http://peacemaker.un.org/
sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MG_110913_Roadmap%20for%20ending%20the%20
crisis%20in%20Madagascar.pdf>
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Nepal
Comprehensive Peace Accord, 2006, <http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/ 
peacemaker.un.org/files/NP_061122_Comprehensive%20Peace%20Agreement 
%20between%20the%20Government%20and%20the%20CPN%20
%28Maoist%29.pdf>
Interim Constitution, 2007, <http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/interim_
constitution_of_nepal_2007_as_amended_by_first_second_and_third_amendments.
pdf>
16-point agreement, August 2015, <http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/nepals-
constitutional-deal-significant-milestone-short-breakthrough>
Constitution, September 2015, <http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/nepal_
constitution_-_official_translaiton_eng_mljpa.pdf>
Rwanda
Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda 
and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law, <http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/
peacemaker.un.org/files/RW_920818_ProtocolOnRuleOfLLaw.pdf>
Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based 
Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and 
the Rwandese Patriotic Front, <http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/
files/RW_930109_ProtocolOnPowerSharing.pdf>
Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the 
Rwandese Patriotic Front (Arusha Accords), 1993, <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/
services/cds/agreements/pdf/rwan1.pdf>
Somalia
Consultative Meeting on Ending the Transition in Somalia: Statement on Adoption of 
the Roadmap, 2011, <http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20
UNPOS/110906%20-%20Signed%20statement%20on%20adoption%20of%20
the%20Roadmap.pdf>
Somali National Consultative Constitutional Conference (Garowe I Principles), 2011, 
<http://unpos.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=HGL2Wx5OstE%3D&tabi
d=9705&language=en-US>
Garowe II Principles, 2012, <http://www.soscensa.org/Files/Garowe-II-Principles.pdf>
The Somali Compact (New Deal), 2013, <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/somalia/
documents/press_corner/20130916_the_somali_compact.pdf>
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Vision 2016: Transitioning Towards Democracy, 2013, <http://www.villasomalia.gov.
so/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Vision_2016_report_FINAL_DRAFT.pdf>
Somali National Consultative Forum on the Electoral Process in 2016, <http://www.
villasomalia.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Facilitation-Guide.pdf>
South Africa
National Peace Accord, 1991, <http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/
files/ZA_910914_National%20Peace%20Accord.pdf>
Interim Constitution, 1993 (adopted 1994), <http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/
files/LCIL/documents/transitions/safrica/SA_19_Interim_Constitution.pdf>
Final Constitution, 1996 (adopted 1997), <https://www.constituteproject.org/
constitution/South_Africa_2012.pdf?lang=en>
South Sudan
Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, 18 
August 2015, <http://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&
id=1193:agreement-on-the-resolution-of-the-conflict-in-the-republic-of-south-
sudan&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=125>
Timor Leste
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, Regulation No. 2001/2: On 
the Election of a Constituent Assembly to Prepare a Constitution for an Independent 
and Democratic East Timor, 2001, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/
past/etimor/untaetR/reg20012.pdf>
Timor-Leste, Constitution of 2002, <https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/
East_Timor_2002.pdf>
Yemen
Agreement on the Implementation Mechanism for the Transition Process in Yemen in 
Accordance with the Initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 2011, <http://
peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/YE_111205_Agreement%20on%20
the%20implementation%20mechanism%20for%20the%20transition.pdf>
Presidential Decree No 26 for the Year (2014) on the establishment of a Constitution 
Drafting Commission, <http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/presidential_decree_
no.26_on_cdc_eng.pdf>
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Office of the President of the Republic of Yemen, ‘Presidential decree forms committee 
to determine regions’, 27 January 2014, <https://presidenthadi-gov-ye.info/en/
archives/presidential-decree-forms-committee-to-determine-regions/>
Zimbabwe
Agreement between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-
PF) and the Two Movement For Democratic Change (MDC) Formations, on Resolving 
the Challenges Facing Zimbabwe, <http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/
files/ZW_080915_Agreement%20between%20ZANU-PF%20and%20MDC%20
on%20Resolving%20the%20Challenges%20Facing%20Zimbabwe.pdf> 
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In situations of violent conflict, negotiated agreements—including 
ceasefire or peace agreements and documents detailing constitutional 
arrangements—attempt to reach a new political settlement between the 
warring protagonists, which is ideally supported by the broader society. 
Such political settlements aim to move the country or region from 
conflict to a situation characterized by constitutional commitments to 
good governance and the rule of law. 
The sequencing—and the success or failure—of these negotiated 
agreements depends on a number of factors, including the diverse 
processes through which a political settlement is reached; when (and 
how) peace agreements and constitutions reach a political settlement; 
when (and why) constitution-making separates from the political 
settlement process; and the consequences of such a separation.
This Policy Paper aims to address the gap in the constitution-
making and peacebuilding literatures regarding descriptive and 
normative accounts of the relationship between peace agreements and 
constitutional arrangements in political settlement processes. It explores 
the sequencing of peace deals and constitutional arrangements in order 
to better understand when (and why) sequencing does not follow the 
logical model, and the implications for any coherent and workable 
constitutional framework.
